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Abstract 
 
This efficiency assessment of Libyan manufacturing firms is unique as efficiency is assessed on a developing 
country that undertakes privatization primarily for political and organizational reasons. Moreover, the state 
of mixed results in the literature with regards to production efficiency between state-owned and private-
owned firms motivated the conduct of this study. Despite deliberate implementation of programs to improve 
efficiency, the situation in Libya was such that firms were able to improve their performance through internal 
efforts even in a negative environment.  This has made the results of this study differ for developed and 
developing countries. For instance, from 1978-2002, the socialism-oriented economy replaced the capitalism 
system, transferring private ownership to the state. This has resulted in low levels of labour productivity, and 
weak structure of production in terms of acquisition of new technology. Moreover, both the United States 
and United Nation Security Council imposed sanctions on Libya from 1992-2003 which have restricted 
foreign direct investments. During these periods, the Libyan manufacturing sector suffered from increasing 
inefficiencies resulting in slowing down of growth of output following decline in labour productivity and 
financial capital. The objective of this study is to compare the technical efficiency of firms before and after 
privatization to be able to differentiate between state control and privatized firms, as well. Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) technique was used to compute the efficiency scores of firms. The average efficiency score 
before privatization was 49.5 per cent, but the score improved to 62.3 per cent after privatization. However, 
this minor improvement was not statistically significant as verified by the Mann-Whitney U test. These 
results have verified the situations in Libya which suggest that firms in Libya have not been prepared for real 
privatization. Consequently, almost all firms faced difficulties in optimizing their own resources 
economically.  
 
Keywords: Privatization, Libya, Data Envelopment Analysis Technique, Technical efficiency 
 
 
 
 
Mohamed Saad Mohamed Abokaresh / Journal of Emerging Economies and Islamic Research / Vol.1 No.1(2013) 
 
2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the early stage of privatization, a considerable debate raged about whether privatization leads to 
improved firm performance (Andrews & Dowling, 1998).  In this context, numerous empirical 
studies focused on the ownership issue. Comparisons were made between the performance of 
privately owned firms and state firms.  In the mid-1980s, many governments around the world 
reached the conclusion that state ownership was not working, and that private ownership was much 
more productive. As a result, there has been a global movement away from the state ownership of 
production and services towards private ownership and free enterprises (Gratton-Lavoie, 2000).  
Libya, a developing country, was no exception in this transformation era.  However, the situation in 
Libya was unique as its privatization initiatives were based on political and organizational reasons. 
Therefore, the results of this study might differ for developed and developing countries.  In other 
words, privatization has no real impact on production efficiency of manufacturing firms in Libya.   
The goal of this study is to contribute to the literature on privatization with a focus on the problems 
and issues in developing countries, such as Libya. This is because Libya has a unique environment 
for studying privatization.  From the mid-1980s until early 2000, these were what had transpired in 
Libya.  The US banned the importation of Libyan oil into the US since 1982 and had put strict rules 
on American exports to Libya. In 1986, the US forced economic sanctions against Libya which 
generally prevented US persons and organizations from any financial transactions involving Libya, 
including the export to Libya of all goods, services, or modern technology; the import of goods or 
services of Libyan origin, engaging in any type of contract in support of an industrial, business-
related, or government project in Libya; and dealing in any possessions in which the government of 
Libya had any interest. The UN also imposed sanctions on Libya for suspected bombing of a US 
Pan American Airway airliner in Lockerbie, Scotland.  During the early 2000s Libya began to make 
policy changes and restore diplomatic ties. This means that for a long period of time, Libya was in 
an isolated position without much foreign competition for its enterprises.  
However there is a recent debate on privatization that there is growing evidence from developed 
countries that privatization alone has been insufficient to stimulate performance improvement.  This 
also has motivated us to conduct this study to verify the impact of privatization on performance; 
however this time for a developing country as Libya. Since the mid-1980s, three waves of 
privatization took place in Libya as economic reform programs. Even though there were three 
privatization attempts in Libya, efforts taken to improve performance of firms failed each time 
because of the constraints that existed in each phase of the privatization initiatives. And the 
constraints were forceful enough to warrant any improvement in performance out of the 
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privatization attempts.  Moreover, the privatization law which was issued by the General People 
Congress to regulate the private sector businesses was only passed in September 1992.  
The first wave of privatization in Libya began in 1987 in response to the drop in oil market prices. 
The drop in the oil market affected the country’s ability to continue with its previous policy. As a 
result the government adopted its first economic reform and allowed for the first time since 1977, 
limited private sector investment in Libya. Therefore, only small scale private sector was allowed to 
participate in retail trade, service and light industries as means of overcoming the inefficiency in 
these industries (Meliha, 1996). Moreover, most of the firms that were privatized through this 
system suffered from performance decline, some even continued with loss-making resulted from 
prior debts.  Additionally their labour force was also intact and in excess.  Also, at that time state 
intervention in the economy remained widespread. Price setting was still state controlled, and this 
resulted in a situation that it was difficult for firms to make profits as in a free market economy.      
The second wave of privatization which began in 1992 was still in response to the drop in the oil 
market prices in early 1990s and the poor financial performance of many public sector firms in 
terms of low productivity.  The government proceeded with another economic reform program. 
However this time, the government introduced the concept of joint-stock company, which allowed 
private companies to open foreign currency accounts and to import equipment (Vanderwalle, 1998).  
This concept was actually to share the burden of public sec tor firms with the private sector.  
Unfortunately, for the second wave of privatization, the performance of some of the privatized firms 
had declined, and their productivity was similar to, if not worse than, the situation before 
privatization.  Some privatized firms suffered from expensive spare parts and also had difficulty 
obtaining them because of procedures that were imposed on the private sector.  Furthermore, during 
the 1999-2001 period most of the public industrial projects were overstaffed, equipped with old 
machinery and suffered from lack of stable management.  Most of the firms were loss makers as 
they were suffering from high inventories. 
The third wave of privatization began in 2003 and this was a large scale privatization program. It 
was described as a program of broadening the ownership base through encouraging residents to own 
the public firms to avoid concentrated ownership.  The program was also aimed to make the country 
eligible for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. The government also chose this 
program, called the Wealth Distribution Program (WDP) as a way to maximize social welfare, 
launched to distribute part of the oil wealth to the population.  The distribution was in the form of 
both cash and shares in the public firms to improve the standard of living of the residents.  The 
WDP program was actually to create people’s capitalism or the program aimed to restructure the 
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economy towards building popular capitalism through spreading share ownership in firms more 
widely.  It is also aimed to transfer the role of the state from the owner to encourager of economic 
activities.  This resulted in the setting up of people’s committee responsible to manage the 
organizations in Libya. Each employee in different departments or management in the Libyan 
company could be a member of the people’s committee which included the head of the company. 
Thus, the top of the hierarchical structure could be managed by employees to contribute at decision 
making.  This process might lead to making wrong decisions because most employees did not have 
good and adequate educational qualifications or period of experience.  Therefore, public 
organizations then were more focused in providing basic goods and services to the citizens rather 
than focusing on maximizing profits.  Hence, performance in terms of production efficiency would 
falter.          
Therefore, the privatization process in Libya was more of changing ownership or sharing ownership 
via deregulation of the markets for the purpose of rescuing troubled public or state firms, and also to 
make the country eligible for WTO membership, that is, the government was attempting to develop 
international links via the WTO; hence its polices at encouraging workers and managers to engage 
in private sector activities. In other words, privatization initiatives were not the real sense of 
privatization to stimulate competition for improved performance of firms.  So this is expected to 
explain why the results of this study differ for developed and developing countries.     . 
This study specifically examines the effect of privatization on technical efficiency of Libyan 
manufacturing firms. This study contributes to the literature on privatization because it adds new 
empirical evidence about Libya, questioning whether the privatization programs have helped to 
improve the production technical efficiency of manufacturing firms. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. Section 2 sets out to review the   literature for relevant past studies, and how 
this study relates to previous works in this field. Section 3 presents the research methodology 
employed. Section 4 explains the research findings, while section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
The public choice, agency and property rights theories outlined theoretical grounds that might 
explain efficiency gains that could arise from privatization. Even though these theories have been 
under criticism, they represent the economic rationale behind efficiency improvement that privately 
owned enterprises will nurture. Nevertheless, past studies showed mixed results on the effect of 
privatization on efficiency . Some studies reported that the performance of firms increased after 
privatization. In contrast, Cabeza and Gomez (2007), Bachiller (2009) and Akram (2009) revealed 
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insignificant improvements after privatization policy. Generally, most empirical studies do not 
subscribe to either of these extreme positions. Rather, most studies reported mixed results as to the 
effect of privatization. As well, there appears to be limited attention paid to ownership structure and 
its effect on successful privatization. 
 
However, supportive evidences on improved technical efficiency obtained from privatizing state 
owned enterprises are limited among the developing nations (Ephraim, 2001). Although the results 
from comparative studies on privatization and state or public owned firms are few, they supported 
the view that privatized firms are more efficient than state owned firms in achieving higher 
efficiency in competitive environments. For instance, the work by Fare, Grosskopf, and Logan 
(1985) compared 30 public and 123 private electric utilities operating in the US in 1970. They 
measured overall efficiency in terms of cost-minimizing effects. Overall efficiency measures were 
disaggregated into overall technical efficiency and allocative (or price) efficiency.  The overall 
technical efficiency was further disaggregated into pure technical efficiency, congestion and scale 
efficiency.  Fare, Grosskopf, and Logan (1985) found that publicly and privately owned utilities 
were not significantly different in terms of the overall allocative and overall technical efficiency 
measures.  They also found that publicly owned utilities have better ratings in terms of pure 
technical efficiency but are worse than privately owned utilities in terms of congestion and scale 
efficiency.  The major source of inefficiency is due to the lack of allocative (price) efficiency. The 
authors concluded that on average the publicly owned are overall slightly more efficient than the 
privately owned electric utilities.    
 
Next, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) compared state owned firms and privatized firms and 
concluded that state-owned firms are less profitable than privatized firms and use more leverage 
than private firms. Boardman et al. (2002) found that privatization improved the technical financial 
performance of companies in Canada. Similar finding was reported by Omran (2004) who evaluated 
the financial and operating performance of privatized Egyptian state owned firms.  A study by Lien 
and Peng (2001) investigated production efficiency in OECD countries from 1980 to 1995 and 
found that increase in technical efficiency improves firm’s production scale. The study concluded 
that competitiveness in telecommunication firms contributed immensely to enhanced technical 
efficiency. Chao-Chung (2006) measured the efficiency change at Chaughwa Telecom Company 
(CHT) in Taiwan before and after privatization using the Data Envelopment Analysis (or DEA) 
technique. He found that CHT’s partial privatization has enhanced its own production efficiency 
significantly. Okten and Arin (2006) tested the effects of privatization on productive and allocative 
efficiency using a rich panel data set of 22 privatized cement plants in Turkey for the period 1983–
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99. They found that ownership effects are sufficient to achieve improvements in labor productivity. 
Meanwhile, Maiti (2007) examined some aspects of productivity and technical efficiency of Indian 
industrial firms at the microeconomic level, particularly the textile industry, as a case study.  
However, he used the Translog Stochastic Frontier production function (or SFA) to estimate the 
technical efficiency of firms. He found that publicly owned firms are relatively less efficient. As 
well, the researcher did not find evidence that older firms tend to be more efficient.  In another 
study, Bachiller (2009) analyzed the efficiency gains achieved by five strategic Spanish firms 
privatized during the 1990s. The study compared the efficiency of these firms before and after 
privatization via the DEA technique. The results showed that the improvements are not related to 
privatization, and the driving idea behind privatization policies that private ownership results in 
greater efficiency was not confirmed for the Spanish companies.  
 
Bhandari (2007) examined the efficiency of Indian industrial firms at the microeconomic level 
using the SFA technique, specifically the firms in the textile industry. The results indicated that 
publicly owned firms were relatively less efficient. Last but not least, Yang (2010) investigated the 
efficiency levels and discussed the managerial implications of 12 international airports in the Asia–
Pacific region based on data collected for the period 1998–2006.  The study applied both DEA and 
SFA techniques to compute the efficiency estimates. He found that inefficiency effects associated 
with the production functions of airports increased over the investigated period. From the 
perspective of mathematical analysis, the author determined that the deviations from the efficient 
frontiers of production functions are largely attributed to technical inefficiency.  
 
3. THE METHODOLOGY AND MODEL  
 
The objective of this study is to test whether Libyan manufacturing firms perform better after 
privatization. To achieve this objective, the secondary data of 21 Libyan manufacturing firms over 
the period 2000-2008 was used to measure technical efficiency levels before and after privatization. 
All the firms were privatized in 2004. Information about the firms was obtained from Libyan 
National Authority in relation to ownership and investment.  The National Authority for the 
ownership and investment information and the Ministry of Industry were the source of data for 
firms prior to privatization, and the annual reports containing financial data was the source of data 
for the firms after privatization. This paper focused on manufacturing sector firms that existed as 
early as the first wave of the privatization program. Therefore, firms from the manufacturing sector 
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comprised the largest number involved in the privatization programs. This condition meets the 
study’s requirement of 3 years before and 3 years after privatization to determine the change in the 
performance of the firms, pre and post privatization. The possibility to obtain the data was bright as 
there were numerous firms in the manufacturing sector, particularly with regards to before the 
privatization period. 32 firms were actually privatized from the manufacturing sector. Eleven firms 
were omitted from the sample because of the difficulties in obtaining data, especially after 
privatization. 
 
To evaluate the technical efficiency measures, three input measures were used for this study. They 
were labor, capital and total assets. The proxy for labor input was the annual total number of 
employees of the firm. The capital cost of each firm was calculated as value of depreciation plus a 
risk free rate of return on capital employed. The real rate of return was to reflect the opportunity 
cost of holding the asset in the business. Total assets are the value of the assets. Meanwhile, the 
output measures used were sales and net income. The sales figure came from the total value of the 
sales. Net income was calculated as sales minus the expenses, interest expense and taxes.       
 
3.1 Methods 
Technical efficiency reflects the ability of a firm to obtain maximum output from a given set of 
inputs (Farrell, 1957). There is an increasing concern in measuring and comparing efficiency of 
firms under different environments and activities. One of the simplest and easiest ways to measure 
efficiency is: 
input
output
Efficiency                                                              (1) 
If a firm produced only one output using one input, this could be done easily. However, this method 
is often inadequate as firms normally produce multiple outputs by using various inputs related to 
different resources. 
 
The measurement of relative efficiency which involves multiple, possibly incommensurate inputs 
and outputs was first addressed by Farrell (1957) and later developed by Farrell and Fieldhouse 
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(1962). The aim of this technique is to define a frontier of most efficient decision making unit(s) (or 
DMU(s)) and then to measure how far from the frontiers are the less efficient units. The relative 
efficiency can be measured as: 
Efficiency =
inputsofsumweighted
outputsofsumweighted
                                                              (2) 
By using usual notations, this efficiency measure can be written 
Efficiency unit j = 
..
..
2211
2211


jj
jj
xvxv
yuyu
                                                                        (3) 
where: 
u1 is the weight given to output 1 
y1j is the amount of output 1 from unit j 
v1 is the weight given to input 1 
x1j is the amount of input 1 to unit j  
  
This measure of efficiency assumes a common set of weights to be applied across all units. This 
raises the problem of how much an agreed common set of weights can be applied to all units. In 
cases where there is only one input and one output, efficiency is often measured in terms of an 
output-input ratio. But, a typical DMU will have multiple inputs and outputs. Efficiency can be 
measured by using a weighted average of the outputs and a weighted average of inputs. When 
comparing efficiency between DMUs, the above measure can be most readily applied when a 
common set of weights for the DMUs is applicable. 
However, in practice it might be difficult for the DMUs to find and agree on a common set of 
weights that can be used. Each DMU might have their own criteria to emphasize outputs and inputs. 
Hence, it might be difficult to attach values to each output and input. Charnes et al. (1978) 
recognized the difficulty in seeking a common weight to determine the relative efficiency measure. 
They recognised the importance that different units might value inputs and outputs differently, so 
that they can adopt different weights. They proposed that each unit should be allowed to adopt a set 
of weights that are favourable to them in comparison to the other units. The DEA technique 
overcomes this problem, where units can relatively value inputs or outputs differently, or where 
there is a high uncertainty or disagreement over the value of some inputs or outputs by allowing 
each DMU to choose its own set of appropriate weights. By doing this, the DMU can obtain an 
efficiency rating due to its ability to minimize inputs. 
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Assuming there are K inputs and M outputs for each N firm. For the firm they are represented by 
the column vectors xi and yi respectively. The NK  input matrix X and NM  output matrix Y 
represent the data for all N firms. Each firm can measure all outputs over inputs in the form of ratios 
as 
i
i
xv
yu
'
'
 where u is a 1M  vector of output weights and v is a 1K  vector is input weights. As 
such, the following mathematical programming is used to solve the optimal weight: 
,min  
subject to     
         0 Yyi                              (4) 
           0  Xxi          
 
where  is a scalar and  is a 1N vector of constant.  
The objective of the linear program is to find an optimal set
 
of weights denoted by   that satisfy the 
K x i constraints
 
and give an efficiency score denoted by 10  k . The magnitude of the weights 
gives information about relevant benchmarks for
 
each inefficient DMU. That is, the weights taking 
on positive
 
values form the set of potential benchmarks for the inefficient
 
DMU in question. The 
DEA model provides the solution
 
as it determines the appropriate benchmarks for the inefficient
 
DMU rather than an exogenous source such as an average. 
This envelopment form involves fewer constraints than the multiplier form 1 NMk , and 
hence is generally the preferred form to solve. In this regard, the DEA Excel Solver developed by 
Zhu (2003) was used to solve the following Slack model: 
sryys
mixxs
rrj
n
j
jr
ij
n
j
jii
....2,1
....2,1
0
1
1
0
*










    (5)   
where 

is and 

rs represent input and output slacks respectively, 
0
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A DMU is efficient if and only if 1
*   and 0

ri ss  for all i and r, and a DMU is weakly 
efficient if 1
*  and 0

is and/or 0

rs  
Whenever we have mix inefficiency the input slack

is shows an exceeding amount of input that 
cause inefficiency in comparison to the related reference set for that DMU. The output slack 

rs shows the shortfall amount of output that causes inefficiency. In order to make DMU0 efficient 
we should decrease its inputs (X0) to X0
*
 which is the optimal input to make DMUo efficient and its 
output (Y0) also should increase to Y0
*
: 
4. THE FINDINGS 
 
This study first examined the most efficient year(s) and used that as a benchmark to judge the level 
of efficiency in every other year. Each year’s financial results for each of the firms are considered 
as a separate DMU. If the DMU is technically efficient, the efficiency ratings equals 1 and the 
ratings will be less than 1 if the DMU is relatively inefficient.  
 
Boussofiane et al. (1997) used both constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale 
(VRS) model in UK privatization and found, except two firms (out of eleven), the results were 
similar irrespective of whether constant or variable returns was assumed . However, this depends if 
the variable returns to scale assumption is invoked. Smith (1993) demonstrates that the 
inappropriate use of the VRS assumption can lead to widely inflated efficiency estimates when the 
sample size is small, which is the present case. As a result,   Boussofiane et al. (1997) attached more 
weight on the CRS DEA model. This study followed similar approach. 
 
4.1 Technical Efficiency Scores of Firms 
 
 
The efficiency scores three years before and three years after privatization were averaged to 
determine the effect of privatization on efficiency. The average technical efficiency scores of the 21 
firms calculated from 2000 to 2008 before and after privatization are provided in Table 1. The 
change in efficiency is shown in the last column of Table 1 where positive value is indicates 
improvement, while a negative value indicates deterioration. The average efficiency rating before 
privatization was 49.5 per cent and improved to 62.3 per cent after privatization. The increase of 
12.8 per cent implies that on average there is minor improvement in technical efficiency of firms 
after privatization.  
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Table 1:  Average Efficiency Scores of Firms  
  
No. Firm Average 
efficienc
y 
before 
Average 
efficienc
y  after 
Change in 
efficiency 
(before-after) 
1 Misurata Textile Firm   0.471 0.932 0.461 
2 Benghazi Textile Firm  0.485 0.640 0.154 
3 Janzur  Textile Firm 0.365 0.323 -0.042 
4 Bani Walid Textile Firm 0.447 0.734 0.287 
5 Janzur firm for Bandages and Cotton 0.429 0.627 0.198 
6 Derna firm for Textile and Cloths  0.227 0.526 0.299 
7 Misurata Furniture Firm 0.275 0.335 0.060 
8 Benghazi Furniture Firm 0.366 0.803 0.437 
9 Derna Furniture Firm 0.580 0.555 -0.025 
10 Al-Sawni Furniture Firm 0.397 0.587 0.191 
11 Arab Firm for Drinks Industry  0.905 0.928 0.023 
12 Zamzam Firm for Soft Drinks  0.946 0.759 -0.187 
13 Abo-Atni Firm for Soft Drinks  0.503 0.995 0.492 
14 Bengashear Firm for Drinking Water Industry  0.517 0.558 0.041 
15 Misurata Biscuit and Cake Firm 0.561 0.384 -0.177 
16 Tripoli Biscuit and Cake Firm 0.394 0.618 0.223 
17 Al-Mahari Firm for Food Industries  0.495 0.449 -0.046 
18 Al-Mansorah Firm for Food Industries 0.643 0.931 0.287 
19 Al-Mamorah Firm for Food Industries  0.431 0.378 -0.053 
20 Cooperation Firm for Food Industries  0.309 0.336 0.027 
21 Al-Bida Furniture Firm 0.648 0.682 0.035 
 Average Efficiency 0.495 0.623 0.128 
 
 
 
Figure 1 depicts technical efficiency scores for four years before privatization and four years after 
privatization. The figure shows that, except for three periods, technical efficiency increased 
annually. Initially, technical efficiency reduced slightly, but thereafter it was increasing annually 
specifically after a sharp decline in technical efficiency in 2001, 2002 and 2003. We could say that 
efficiency was much affected during the sanction period, imposed on Libya over the years 1992-
2003. The graph shows an upward trend meaning that technical efficiency was increasing year by 
year indicating that technical efficiency improved after privatization. The highest technical 
efficiency score was achieved in 2007 at 65.9 per cent, while the worst score was 45.5 per cent 
achieved in 2002.  
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Figure 1:  Technical Efficiency Scores of All Firms 
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To test whether the increase was statistically significant, the Mann-Whitney U test was applied. The 
Mann-Whitney U test is a non-parametric counterpart of the t-test that is used to compare means. 
As the study used the non-parametric analysis, the Mann-Whitney U test is appropriate for this 
study. As shown in Table 2, overall the difference in efficiency before and after privatization was 
0.128, a change that is in the positive direction. However, in the Mann-Whitney U test, the p-value 
was 0.08, which was more than 0.05 (i.e., at 95 per cent confidence level). Thus, there was no 
significant difference in the average efficiency measures before and after privatization. This means 
that the increase in technical efficiency of 12.8 per cent after privatization was not significant.  
 
 
Table 2: Results of Mann-Whitney U Test of All Firms (Technical Efficiency) 
Average 
Efficiency 
Mean  before 
privatization 
Mean after 
privatization 
Mean Increase/ 
Decrease 
p-value 
All firms 0.495 0.623 0.128 0.080 
 Note: This table shows the mean technical efficiency scores and Mann-Whitney U test results 
before and after privatization of all firms.  
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4.2 Technical Efficiency by Ownership Structure 
 
In this section, technical efficiency of the fully privatized firms and firms with state government 
control are examined separately. The efficiency scores before and after privatization was averaged 
to determine the effect of privatization on efficiency. This section aims to examine if ownership 
structure had any influence in determining the level of technical efficiency.  
 
4.3 Technical Efficiency Scores of State Owned Firms  
The average technical efficiency scores of the 7 state owned firms 3 years before and 3 years after 
privatization, are provided in Table 3. The change in efficiency is shown in the last column of Table 
3. Though change values are positive, 5 firms out of 7 showed positive performance meaning that 
57.1 per cent of firms have improved technical efficiency after privatization. The average efficiency 
rating before privatization was 49.6 per cent and improved to 59.2 per cent after privatization.  
Janzur Textile Firm, in particular, had the lowest efficiency score before and after privatization of 
0.36 and 0.32 respectively. Zamzam Firm for Soft Drinks scored the highest efficiency score before 
privatization (0.94) and Benghazi Furniture Firm scored the highest efficiency score after 
privatization (0.80). This indicates that all firms were operating inefficiently pre-and post 
privatization, which means that all the firms faced difficulties in using their own resources 
efficiently.      
 
Table 3: Average Efficiency Scores of State Owned Firms 
 
No. Firm Ave 
efficienc
y 
Before 
Average 
efficienc
y after 
Change in 
efficiency 
(before-after) 
1 Janzur  Textile Firm 0.365 0.323 -0.042 
2 Bani Walid Textile Firm 0.447 0.734 0.287 
3 Benghazi Furniture Firm 0.366 0.803 0.437 
4 Al-Sawni Furniture Firm 0.397 0.587 0.191 
5 Zamzam Firm for Soft Drinks  0.946 0.759 -0.187 
6 Bengashear Firm for Drinking Water Industry  0.517 0.558 0.041 
7 Al-Mamorah Firm for Food Industries  0.431 0.378 -0.053 
 Average Efficiency 0.496 0.592 0.096 
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The results of the Mann-Whitney U test for differences in efficiency scores before and after 
privatization for state owned firms are provided in Table 4. The p-value of the test was 0.383, which 
was more than 0.05. Thus, there was no significant difference in the average efficiency scores 
before and after privatization meaning that the increase of 9.36 per cent in technical efficiency was 
not significant. 
 
 
Table 4: Results of Mann-Whitney U Test of State Owned Firms 
Average Efficiency Mean  before 
Privatization Mean after privatization 
Mean Increase/ 
Decrease 
p-value 
State owned firms 
 
0.496 0.592 0.096 0.383 
Note: This table shows the mean technical efficiency scores and Mann-Whitney U test results for 
state owned firms, before and after privatization.  
 
 
4.4 Technical Efficiency Scores of Privatized Firms  
 
The average technical efficiency scores of the 14 fully privatized firms 3 years before and 3 years 
after privatization are provided in Table 5. The change in efficiency is shown in the last column of 
Table 5. Though most of the change values were positive, the efficiency scores prior to privatization 
was 49.1 per cent and increased to 64.5 per cent after privatization, indicating an increase in 
technical efficiency of 15.3 per cent. A closer examination explains that out of 14 firms, only 3 
firms, that is, Derna Furniture firm, Misurata Biscuit and Cake firm and Al-Mahari firm for Food 
Industries show a decline in technical efficiency, meaning that 78.5 per cent of firms showed 
increase in technical efficiency. However, these results indicated that these firms had slacks in not 
using their resources efficiently to produce the same level of outputs.  
 
The findings show that the average technical efficiency score was 0.49 before privatization where 6 
firms were operating above the average and 8 were operating below it. This means that 42.9 per 
cent of the firms operating above the average and 57.1 per cent of the firms operating below it. As 
well, the findings show that none of the firms scored full efficiency (i.e., TE = 1.00). On the other 
hand, the average technical efficiency score was 0.64 after privatization indicating that 5 firms (35.7 
per cent of the firms) were operating above the average and 9 firms (64.4 per cent of the firms) were 
operating below the average. However, none of the firms scored full efficiency (TE = 1.00) after 
privatization.  Based on the statistical tests, none of the changes were significant at the 95 per cent 
confidence level. 
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Table 5: Average Efficiency Scores of Privatized Firms 
  
No. Firm Ave 
efficiency  
Before 
Ave efficiency  
after 
Change in 
efficiency 
(before-after) 
1 Misurata Textile Firm   0.471 0.932 0.461 
2 Benghazi Textile Firm  0.485 0.640 0.154 
3 Janzur Firm for Bandages and Cotton 0.429 0.627 0.198 
4 Derna Firm for Textile and Cloths  0.227 0.526 0.299 
5 Misurata Furniture Firm 0.275 0.335 0.060 
6 Derna Furniture Firm 0.580 0.555 -0.025 
7 Arab Firm for Drinks Industry  0.905 0.928 0.023 
8 Abo-Atni Firm for Soft Drinks  0.503 0.995 0.492 
9 Misurata Biscuit and Cake Firm 0.561 0.384 -0.177 
10 Tripoli Biscuit and Cake Firm 0.394 0.618 0.223 
11 Al-Mahari Firm for Food Industries  0.495 0.449 -0.046 
12 Al-Mansorah Firm for Food Industries 0.643 0.931 0.287 
13 Cooperation Firm for Food Industries  0.309 0.336 0.027 
14 Al-Bida Furniture Firm 0.648 0.682 0.035 
 Average Efficiency 0.491 0.645 0.153 
 
 
 
The results of the Mann-Whitney U test for differences in efficiency scores before and after 
privatization of fully privatized firms are provided in Table 6. The p-value of the test was 0.178, 
which was more than 0.05. Thus, there was no significant difference in the average efficiency 
scores, meaning that the increase of 15.3 per cent in technical efficiency was not significant.  
 
 Table 6:  Results of Mann-Whitney U Test of Privatized Firms 
 
Average  
Efficiency 
Mean  before 
Privatization 
Mean after 
privatization 
Mean Increase/ Decrease p-value 
Fully privatized firms 0.491 0.645 0.153 0.178 
Note: This table shows the mean technical efficiency scores and results of the Mann-Whitney U test 
of fully privatized firms, before and after privatization.  
 
Figure 2 shows the technical efficiency scores of two types of ownership structure (firms with state 
owned and full privatized firms).  Comparing the results of the two groups, the highest technical 
efficiency score of 69.5 per cent was obtained by the fully privatized firms in 2007, while the 
lowest 43.3 per cent was obtained by fully privatized firms in 2002. The technical efficiency scores 
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were unstable over the period of study, especially before privatization. The efficiency scores of 
fully privatized firms increased slightly after privatization, particularly in 2008. In relation to firms 
with state control the efficiency scores increased after privatization, but the scores were unstable in 
two years, that is, 2006 and 2007.   The figure showed that the fully privatized firms were more 
efficient than firms with state control, after privatization. However, the overall results indicated that 
the increase for the both groups was not statistically significant. This might be due to inability for 
greater autonomy and exposure to competitive markets that created a stronger sense of 
responsibility and greater commitment among the privatized firms to cut waste in order to improve 
performance. The non-significant result implies that the privatized firms are not at maturity stage of 
development, but still on the learning curve.   
 
Figure 2: Technical Efficiency Scores according to Ownership Structure 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examined the technical efficiency scores of 21 Libyan manufacturing firms before and 
after privatization by using input-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique. DEA is a 
linear programming technique used to generate technical efficiency scores of decision making units 
or firms. The findings showed that in terms of overall performance, there was little improvement in 
technical efficiency scores of all the firms after privatization. Even so, the improvement of 12.8 per 
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cent was not significant in relation to ownership structure. The firms were divided into different 
ownership types. In the first group, firms with state control revealed that there was an improvement 
in technical efficiency of 9.6 per cent after privatization; however, this increase was not significant. 
Meanwhile fully privatized firms showed an improvement of 15.3 per cent in technical efficiency 
after privatization and likewise this improvement was not significant. This might be due to inability 
for greater autonomy and exposure to competitive markets.  We had been made known that the 
primary purpose of the privatization processes in Libya was into getting the private owned firms to 
share the burden of the state owned firms, and to acquire WTO membership for international 
trading helping to generate income for the country. Hence there was no competitive pressure in 
order to sustain performance, implying that the fully privatized firms are still on the learning curve. 
Only when the local market is fully opened to foreign competition would there be a strong sense of 
responsibility and great commitment among firms to reduce waste and achieve optimal 
performance. For now, the results indicate that all the firms were operating inefficiently before and 
after privatization. This implies that all the firms were not planned for the privatization proper 
resulting in some of them experiencing difficulties in optimizing their own resources economically. 
Nevertheless, the results indicate that privatization programs in Libya had somewhat impacted on 
the performance of manufacturing firms, only that the manner in which the programs were 
conducted were not for the improvement in performance of the overall sector or industry within 
which the firms are in.  
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